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Following pipeline leaks on the Alaskan North Slope in 2006, the state of Alaska, by executive 
order of the governor, responded by establishing the Petroleum Systems Integrity Office (PSIO) 
as the lead state agency responsible for oversight of the maintenance of facilities, equipment, and 
infrastructure for oil and natural gas resources in Alaska.  
 The executive order identified three major activities for PSIO:   
• An assessment of Alaska’s oil and gas infrastructure integrity; 
• An assessment of current regulatory oversight in Alaska; and 
• A review of industry oversight efforts. 
PSIO efforts identified infrastructure components with indeterminate regulatory oversight. In 
addition, PSIO recommended improvements in state oversight, including establishment of 
minimum requirements for operators’ integrity management systems and the ability to collect 
sufficient information to develop leading performance indicators.   
PSIO was consolidated into another state agency in 2014 and its mission was suspended in 2015. 
Future efforts to improve policies, systems, and methods of oversight will depend on executive 
direction, legislative support, and emphasis within state agencies.  
Introduction 
In 2006 a North Slope elevated pipeline at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska leaked over 5,000 barrels of oil, 
making it the largest oil spill on Alaska's North Slope to-date. The 34-inch diameter pipeline, 
operated by BP Exploration, Alaska (BPXA), was decommissioned and later replaced with a 20-
inch diameter pipeline.  
This leak and a subsequent smaller leak from another BPXA-operated pipeline at the Prudhoe 
Bay oil field resulted in an extended partial shutdown of oil delivery from the Prudhoe Bay field 
to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). The leaks resulted from undetected internal 
corrosion in the field’s oil transit pipelines. Post-incident reports found that an inadequate 
inspection program and ineffective corrosion inhibitor application by BPXA were the proximate 
causes of the corrosion and leaks.1 
BP subsequently pled guilty to negligent discharge of oil under the federal Clean Water Act and 
was fined $20 million in November 2007. BP also paid a $25 million civil penalty in July 2011 
and agreed to take measures to significantly improve inspection and maintenance of its pipeline 
infrastructure on the North Slope. In November 2012, the state of Alaska announced it would 
collect $255 million from BP related to state revenue losses from the resulting field shutdown. 
From a regulatory perspective, the pipelines that leaked were not under the oversight of either 
federal or state authorities. The pipelines were of a category (low stress, rural) that was exempt 
from federal oversight, and the state of Alaska does not have its own pipeline safety program. 
Although this regulatory gap was not the primary reason for BPXA’s performance problems, 
both the federal and state governments responded with efforts to increase regulatory control.  
The federal government, through the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA), promptly issued compliance orders under its emergency powers to protect life and 
property. PHMSA also accelerated promulgation of regulations addressing similar “low stress” 
pipelines.  
Out of concern that other regulatory gaps may exist regarding petroleum infrastructure, the state 
of Alaska responded by creating the Petroleum Systems Integrity Office (PSIO) by executive 
order of Governor Sarah Palin.2 This paper addresses the results of PSIO’s efforts to discharge 
the mandate of the executive order.   
The Petroleum Systems Integrity Office 
The governor’s executive order established the PSIO Coordinator as the state’s lead official for 
exercising oversight of the maintenance of facilities, equipment, and infrastructure for oil and 
natural gas resources in the state. The order established the goals of the PSIO: 
• Ensure that oil and gas infrastructure is designed and maintained in a safe and 
environmentally sound manner in compliance with state law;  
• Minimize economic impacts of unplanned interruptions in oil and gas production to the 
ongoing functions of state government; 
• Avoid premature abandonment of oil and gas infrastructure and waste of state resources; 
and 
• Ensure efficient and effective oversight of oil and gas industry practices by utilizing 
existing state government structures and processes to the maximum extent possible. 
The order identified three major activities to be executed by PSIO:   
• An assessment of Alaska’s oil and gas infrastructure integrity; 
• An assessment of current regulatory oversight in Alaska; and 
• A review of industry oversight efforts. 
Each of these major activities is discussed in this paper. 
Assessment of Alaska’s Oil and Gas Infrastructure Integrity 
PSIO’s assessment was intended to identify potential threats and risks to infrastructure that may 
result in unacceptable consequences to Alaska’s citizens, environment, or economy. The 
assessment, along with a review of the current regulatory structure and the petroleum industry’s 
risk assessment practices, provided a framework in which to evaluate oversight efforts and the 
integrity of Alaska’s petroleum infrastructure. 
Factors Influencing Infrastructure Condition 
The condition of the state’s oil and gas infrastructure is affected by a number of hazards and 
threats. Among these include the effect of aging facilities, changes in industry operations, 
changes in the characteristics of produced petroleum, the effectiveness of operator integrity 
management programs, and industry performance of appropriate maintenance activities.  
As the oil and gas industry has developed, new systems have been added and older systems have 
been modernized or mothballed. Changes in the infrastructure have been made to increase 
efficiency and production, to improve system integrity, and to adapt to changes in field 
characteristics – all concurrent with advancements in oil and gas science and technology. 
The current condition of the infrastructure is a result of the combined effects of aging facilities, 
changes in risk profile, the adequacy of operations and maintenance practices, and government 
oversight emphasis. Factors that negatively affect infrastructure condition are primarily 
undetected changes in threat exposure and subsequent inadequate maintenance programs to 
address these new threats. 
Aging Facilities 
The useful life of a facility or pipeline is virtually unlimited, given the execution of appropriate 
maintenance, repair, and replacement programs.3 However, as infrastructure ages the need for 
vigilance in such programs increases.  
Infrastructure reliability issues typically follow a life cycle that can be represented by a “bathtub 
curve” wherein an early-life break-in period is followed by a period of steady operation, which is 
in turn followed by a period of increasing failure rates. 
However, some threats to system integrity, such as corrosion, are time-dependent and increase as 
a facility ages. Internal corrosion has caused leaks in pipelines in Cook Inlet and the North Slope 
and appears to be more prevalent in older pipelines.4 
Likewise, external corrosion in the Prudhoe Bay and Kuparuk oil fields is exacerbated by design 
decisions made in the early days of development that left some insulated field pipeline joints 
uncoated and exposed to corrosive atmospheric conditions. There are extensive “find and fix” 
programs underway in the North Slope oil fields where this design abides.5 
Changes in Risk Profile 
Most of the state’s oil and gas infrastructure has been in place for decades. Over time, the 
physical characteristics of the petroleum production streams have changed, requiring operators to 
continually assess, monitor, and/or modify systems to be appropriate for changed operating 
conditions. If this continuous assessment process is not well-executed, the original design basis 
for some systems may not be appropriate for current conditions and may result in an increased 
risk of failure. 
For example, North Slope oil production has been decreasing for a number of years. The 2006 
BP oil spills were partially a result of an unrecognized change in risk due to lower flow rates that 
contributed to solids accumulation in oil transit pipelines. The accumulated solids blocked 
detection and mitigation of active corrosion cells. Although adequate maintenance pigging and 
use of chemical corrosion inhibitors are two primary means to control and mitigate internal 
corrosion, the lack of a subsequent adjustment in maintenance practices resulted in these 
integrity breaches. 
In an effort to adapt to changes in risk, the operators of the trans-Alaska pipeline (TAPS) are 
studying hazards and threats related to operating at low flow rates in cold conditions, due to 
declining North Slope oil production. Significant changes in TAPS infrastructure and operating 
practices will be required to address the changing conditions.6 
New Industrial Operators 
Development of infrastructure in remote areas of Alaska has lowered the cost barriers to entry of 
new companies to explore for opportunities and to operate older fields that are acquired from the 
initial developers. This change, while a welcomed development for the economic health of the 
state, could potentially increase risks from new operations that may not have been proven for 
arctic or sub-arctic conditions, and from new operators that may have varying levels of integrity 
management and quality assurance systems in place. 
Emphasis in Government Oversight 
Regulatory oversight in the petroleum industry has changed with emerging issues, but the 
changes typically are reactive rather than proactive. This reactive nature of regulatory change is a 
natural reflection of the limited ability of any regulatory structure to anticipate change in the 
character of threats. Traditional regulatory values of fairness, consistency, proportionality, and 
predictability are sometimes at odds with a proactive approach.7  The result is a regulatory lag as 
rulemaking and due-process efforts “catch up” to emerging threats and changes in hazard 
exposure. 
Regulators can use a risk identification process to anticipate changes in hazard exposure and to 
help focus regulatory emphasis. However, the use of risk assessments to anticipate change in 
risk, while appropriate for the operator of the infrastructure, can be problematic if used by 
regulators without the necessary tools for assessment. Risk assessments are ephemeral, data-
intensive, and require regular updating to develop trends and identify problem areas.8 
Regulators should nevertheless ensure that an operator’s risk management processes are effective 
and available to the regulator in order to understand the risk assessments and threat mitigation 
measures used by the infrastructure owner. Development and oversight of minimum standards of 
effective operator integrity management programs is a key way to ensure that risks are mitigated 
to the greatest extent feasible.9 
Assessment of Regulatory Oversight  
To address this mandate, PSIO reviewed state regulatory oversight of petroleum systems 
infrastructure. Federal oversight was not included in this assessment. This effort is described 
below and comprised of three steps: 
• Identify state agencies’ regulatory authorities and practices; 
• Identify potential oversight gaps; and 
• Develop prioritized corrective actions based on risk. 
Identification of Agency Authorities and Practices 
A review of the regulatory framework governing safe operation of Alaska’s oil and gas 
infrastructure is useful as a baseline for determining if the existing authorities are appropriate for 
current conditions. In broad terms, this regulatory assessment focused on oil and natural gas 
production systems from the wellhead to the point where hydrocarbons are either loaded onto 
tanker vessels for shipment out of state or at the point of transfer to a refinery. 
Designated state government agencies are identified in the executive order as agencies that 
regulate aspects of oil and gas operations. Liaison officers from these agencies serve as the 
primary point of contact representing their respective agency and coordinate directly with the 
PSIO coordinator. 
Through the liaison officers, agencies were requested to identify the statutes, regulations, or 
other legally authoritative documents or orders that define their authority or confer responsibility 
over petroleum systems/facilities. PSIO used this information to identify and document each 
agency’s intent, responsibilities, programs, jurisdiction, and compliance/enforcement tools.  
Identification of Potential Regulatory Oversight Gaps 
Each designated agency was requested to list and describe any known authority or responsibility 
that is duplicative or that conflicts with those of another state or federal agency, and to identify 
any known gaps in existing authority or jurisdiction. PSIO reviewed the agency-identified gaps 
through a verification and validation process that included an independent review of statute, 
regulation, and other authoritative documentation to ensure that all regulatory or oversight 
powers were identified. 
The use of “gap” terminology can be problematic in analyzing the regulatory regime in Alaska.  
Identification of a “gap” could imply that there is a preferred regulatory framework for oil and 
gas infrastructure that serves as a baseline for comparison, and in comparison Alaska’s 
framework contains gaps. There is no such framework for comparative benchmarking, and likely 
should not be, since the organizing of state laws and regulations around an infrastructure-based 
schema could lead to complexity and unintended adverse consequences. However, the “gap” 
terminology can be useful as shorthand for identifying areas of jurisdictional uncertainty and 
opportunities for improvement. 
Prioritization of Gaps 
Two primary categories of gaps were defined, as follows: 
• A jurisdictional gap is defined as a situation in which no state agency has a program or 
authority to oversee an infrastructure type or activity, as well as a situation when a state 
agency has only partial or limited authority; and  
• A process gap is defined as a shortcoming in the process that an agency uses to execute 
its statutory authority. Identification of a process gap is somewhat subjective and occurs 
when a particular authority is not well-executed because of inadequate execution 
processes, lack of resources, or competing program priorities. 
Process gaps are generally corrected by continuous improvement efforts by the individual 
agencies. All agencies have internal goal-setting and process review programs, and focus areas 
are usually set by the executive branch and legislative budget priorities. Process gaps were 
identified in this assessment, but only as an effort to help agencies focus internal improvement 
strategies. 
Jurisdictional gaps, on the other hand, require a corrective action that reduces risk of a specific 
threat. Consequently, this assessment focused on jurisdictional gaps.  
A potential gap in oversight does not necessarily imply a risk to the state. If oversight is not 
exercised on a given facility, the risk to infrastructure integrity may indeed increase. However, if 
oversight is not exercised as intended, but compensating agency processes are in place, then the 
risk to infrastructure may be mitigated. 
To identify gaps of the greatest importance to the state, a qualitative impact analysis (QIA) was 
used to organize and consolidate the gaps. The QIA methodology ranked the impacts associated 
with gaps by using a team of in-house experts and a structured framework. Based on the outcome 
of the QIA, gaps were placed in “buckets” of impacts: High, Medium, Low, and Very Low. This 
priority ranking helps focus actions and target resources to correcting the gaps that present the 
greatest potential impact. 
Assessment Findings  
The assessment determined that some petroleum system infrastructure components are operated 
without clearly defined state oversight roles, including: 
• Offshore platform structures; 
• Pipelines and facilities carrying natural gas; and 
• Pipelines authorized under non-common carrier easements. 
The  risk  from  this  oversight  uncertainty  may  be  partially  mitigated  by  concomitant  
federal oversight of some of these systems. However, since federal oversight was not included in 
this assessment, the degree of risk and level of mitigation is indeterminate. 
Corrective Actions for Improved Regulatory Oversight 
In general, oversight gaps may be closed or otherwise mitigated in a number of ways: 
• The agency can propose new statutes or regulations; 
• Agencies  can  develop  memoranda  of  agreement  or  understanding  to  coordinate  
their activities; 
• The agency can adopt standardized and formal business practices; and/or 
• The  agency  can  develop  remedies  through  mitigation  measures  currently  allowed  
by regulation. 
PSIO used this assessment to identify areas for improved regulatory oversight and to develop 
prioritized corrective actions based on risk. These efforts included the following: 
• PSIO led a project with agencies to unify oversight over all petroleum pipelines. Some 
pipelines were seen to be outside the safety regulations of state and federal agencies. 
These pipelines are authorized by the state as a permitted land use, but safety oversight 
needed improvement. 
• To improve consistent application of safer designs, PSIO clarified the “practice of 
engineering” as defined in Alaska statutes regarding lessee/operator submittals to state 
agencies. PSIO recommended that professional engineers registered in Alaska design oil 
and gas facilities submitted for agency reviews.  
• PSIO proposed new mitigation measures for future lease sales that would require lessees 
to describe how expected risks associated with the lessee’s activities will be identified, 
managed, and minimized. A key element of these measures would require lessees to 
demonstrate a management system that controls processes for risk assessment, data 
collection, and incident investigation.  
PSIO also identified opportunities that would improve agency coordination and facilitate 
improved data collection for trending analysis. PSIO contracted with the Mary Kay O’Connor 
Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University (MKOPSC) to provide technical assistance on a 
number of projects, including development of: 
• Investigation protocols for independent root cause analyses of future oilfield incidents 
and accidents; 
• An operator management systems assessment program for lessees; and 
• A plan for tracking and trending system infrastructure conditions on state lands. 
Review of Industry Oversight Efforts 
The restrictions upon state agencies, by statute or regulation, that limit sharing of confidential 
information with PSIO and each other made the industry evaluation mandated by the executive 
order unattainable. The operators are not required by statute or regulation to provide operational 
data directly to PSIO and therefore declined to provide data that is not publicly available. 
Instead, PSIO conducted a data review of available public information regarding performance of 
Alaska’s oil and gas producers and operators. PSIO’s designated agencies assisted this effort by 
providing non-confidential data on performance characteristics of the state’s oil and gas 
infrastructure. 
This data review found that no single agency in the state collects, aggregates, and reports 
information that would facilitate a coordinated approach to oversight of oil and gas industry 
performance. In addition, individual agency “data silos” can form that constrict access to 
information by other agencies, primarily due to a lack of confidentiality agreements among state 
agencies.  
Overall Recommendations 
PSIO submitted recommendations for improved state oversight to the liaison agencies.10 Among 
them was a recommendation to establish minimum requirements for operators’ integrity 
management systems. Without the ability to verify compliance with these requirements, the 
integrity profile of petroleum infrastructure may be indeterminate to state regulators. 
The recommendations also called for new oversight tools that include the ability to collect 
sufficient information to develop leading performance indicators and to monitor trends, which in 
turn would lead to improved policies, systems, and methods of oversight.  
Upon completion of a comprehensive review of  state oversight practices, PSIO was consolidated 
with the state Pipeline Coordinator’s Office in 2014 to allow resources to be applied to 
infrastructure requiring additional focus.11 The emphasis for PSIO’s mission shifted to 
establishing consistent oversight of the assessment-identified set of indeterminate infrastructure: 





The mission of PSIO was suspended in 2015 as a result of budget reductions and reallocation of 
resources.12 With increasing pressure on future operating budgets, the ability to provide 
appropriate oversight will depend on development of efficient and effective regulatory tools and 
inter-agency cooperation.  
Future efforts to improve policies, systems, and methods of oversight will depend on executive 
direction, legislative support, and emphasis within state agencies. Without these efforts, it will be 
challenging to develop strategic regulatory reform that will support fewer incidents, a safer 
workforce, and a consistent revenue stream. 
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